Georges Bataille’s ‘Ethics of Violence’ by Evangelou, Angelos
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Evangelou, Angelos  (2010) Georges Bataille’s ‘Ethics of Violence’.   Skepsi, 3  (2).   pp. 51-64.
 ISSN 1758-2679.
DOI












University of Kent 
 
n understanding of Georges BatailleÕs Ôethics of violenceÕ requires that violence be 
read in the general context of his theory of the heterogeneous,
2
 as well as from an 
amoral perspective. This element of amorality, which I will shortly discuss briefly, is tightly 
connected to the heterogeneous, which is what is denied and rejected on the very ground of 
what has generally been considered moral. Bataille therefore calls for a return to what has so 
far been excluded and rejected as dangerous, monstrous, destructive, sick, mad and perverse 
on these grounds. The expression of violence is just one of the manifestations of the 
heterogeneous which is met with most resistance in this project of revaluation, because of its 
complex web of psychological, ethical and political implications. At this early stage, a 
clarification is of the essence: the term ÔethicsÕ is to be distinguished from ÔmoralityÕ.
3
 For 
this distinction, I am drawing on the analysis of the two terms by Bernard Williams, who 
himself draws on the Socratic question, Ôhow should one live?Õ, contrasting it with questions 
such as Ôwhat is our duty?Õ or Ôhow may we be good?Õ. Williams explains that SocratesÕ 
question may be interpreted as one about Ôa good lifeÕ or Ôa life worth livingÕ but that it does 
not in itself Ôbring in any distinctive moral claimsÕ (Williams 1993: 5). He therefore argues 
that Ômorality should be understood as a particular development of the ethical, one that has a 
special significance in modern Western culture. [Morality] emphasizes certain ethical notions 
rather than others, developing in particular a special notion of obligation [...] In view of these 
features it is also, I believe, something we should treat with a special skepticismÕ (6; emphasis 
added).  
It is precisely this notion of morality as a Ôspecial system [which] demands a sharp 
boundary for itself (in demanding ÒmoralÓ and ÒnonmoralÓ senses for words, for instance)Õ 
(7) that Bataille aims to transgress (and not reject). In this sense, BatailleÕs project challenges 
                                                
1
  This article was first presented as a paper at Pharmakon: Literature and Violence, a postgraduate conference 
organised by the School of English at the University of Kent and held on 20th May 2010. 
2
  Bataille does not italicise the key concepts he analyses, e.g. ÔheterogeneousÕ, ÔheterogeneityÕ, ÔheterologyÕ 
ÔhomogeneousÕ, ÔhomogeneityÕ and ÔhypermoralityÕ, unless he treats them as terms to be defined. The terms are 
italicised throughout this article, so that it is clear that they are used as Bataillean concepts. However, it should 
be noted that not all italicised words in this article are necessarily Bataillean concepts. 
3
  In ÔNot Choosing between Morality and EthicsÕ, Robert Piercey argues that even if HegelÕs distinction 
between Sittlichkeit (ethical life) and Moralitt (morality) does not Ômap exactly onto the contemporary 
distinction between ethics and moralityÕ, it is Hegel who Ôpaves the way for such a distinctionÕ (Piercey 
2001: 54). 
A 




conceptions of morality which have excluded the heterogeneous but remain within the realm 
of the ÔethicalÕ which consists of this very act of transgressing ÔmoralityÕ. The alternative 
(transgressed) morality, which has already acknowledged and opened up to the 
heterogeneous, Bataille calls ÔhypermoralityÕ and will reappear in the last part of this article. 
Before that, I will first demonstrate the relationship between violence and the heterogeneous 
by contextualising it in BatailleÕs science of heterology and his wider discussion of suffering 
and anguish. This discussion will revolve around the events and the ideas that played a 
significant part in BatailleÕs fascination with violence, his understanding of anguish and war, 
and BatailleÕs reaction to the reception of his thought about violence especially in the context 
of and in relation to Nazi violence.  
1. The Science of Heterology 
Those who aim at an experience of human entirety and freedom need, according to Bataille, to 
acknowledge and embrace the heterogeneous, that is, the !"#$%v [the other] element in 
existence, a term which should already suggest a moving away from what is or can be made 
our own and familiar and which is eventually identified as one with us, the &µ% [the same]. 
ÔThe very term heterogeneous,Õ Bataille writes in ÔThe Psychological Structure of FascismÕ, 
Ôindicates that it concerns elements which are impossible to assimilateÕ (Bataille 1979: 67). 
On the one hand therefore, homogeneity is associated with assimilable entities and qualities, 
elimination of differences and individuality, conformity, reason, accumulation of power, 
energy and wealth, as well as a hypocritical rejection of those aspects of life which put the 
individual in any kind of risk or instability, be these physical or psychological. Heterogeneity, 
on the other hand, clearly stands in total opposition to all this. The realm of the heterogeneous 
contains what is conventionally classified as base, filthy and dangerous and is therefore 
associated with the world of the wastes, bodily and mental: excrement, sweat, menstrual 
blood, sperm, vomit, deviant sexual acts, Ôthe various unconscious processes such as dreams 
or neurosesÕ (69), madness, cannibalism, sacrifices, squandering, crime, violence etc. In short, 
the term heterogeneous encompasses all social phenomena characterised by Ôviolence, excess, 
delirium, madnessÕ (70; emphasis in the original). Acknowledgement of the heterogeneous 
therefore implies not only tolerating but also perceiving it and living it as necessary. Only 
then is the commonly valued aspect of life (beautiful, good, pure etc.) justified: ÔI love purity 
to the point of loving impurity; without it purity would be a fraudÕ (Bataille 2008: 42).  
To the study of these heterogeneous elements, Bataille gives the name of science. This is 
a word choice which could be interpreted as ironic, yet it is successful in denoting the 




seriousness and respect, one could even say piety, with which Bataille approaches the 
heterogeneous: the science of heterology. Among the other words which Bataille was 
considering when making his choice, as Michel Surya (2002: 138) and Dennis Hollier (1989: 
131) explain, were the words scatology and agiology, Greek words for the study or science of 
excrement and saintliness, for their repulsive and sacred character respectively.  
It is important to distinguish, however, the science of heterology from the heterogeneous. 
While the heterogeneous is inassimilable and unrepresentable, heterology is a product of 
rationality, set in motion by the rational intention to acknowledge the inassimilability of the 
heterogeneous. This intention, however, risks either being hypocritical about its actual bonds 
with the heterogeneous or appropriating it by making false claims about it. Such an 
appropriation implies a fake, even if unintentional, bridging of the gap between the 
heterogeneous and the homogeneous, in other words, between the inassimilable, 
unrepresentable and discourse-less, on the one hand, and discourse and representation, on the 
other. Despite this, it needs to be acknowledged that the science of heterology marks the space 
within rationality where the supremacy of reason Ð and by extension the multifaceted 
expression of homogeneity Ð is put into question, or according to Botting and Wilson, that it 
marks Ôthe uncertain space within rationality where heterogeneity declares its necessity...Õ 
(1993: 197; ellipsis in the original). It is the response of reason to this declaration that Bataille 
concentrates on when he explains that Ôthe intellectual process automatically limits itself by 
producing of its own accord its own waste products, thus liberating in a disordered way the 
heterogeneous excremental elementÕ (Bataille 1997: 153). On the one hand, Bataille is careful 
to maintain and respect the distance between the heterogeneous and heterology, even if on the 
other, he proposes an experience of getting as close as possible to the former. Bataille is 
interested in experiencing the horrors that are involved in this movement towards the 
heterogeneous, which he describes as inner experience. ÔBy inner experienceÕ, Bataille writes, 
ÔI understand that which one usually calls mystical experience: the states of ecstasy, or 
rapture, at least of meditated emotionÕ (Bataille 1988b: 3; italics in the original). Inner 
experience is therefore a state, in which everything (including oneself, or rather mainly 
oneself) is challenged; in short, inner experience Ôis, in fever and anguish, the putting into 
question (to the test) of that which a man knows of beingÕ (4). In inner experience oneÕs 
rational faculties are not absent, yet one tries to maintain them in a dormant state; it is 
generated by reason with the intention of challenging itself and the claims that are made on its 
behalf: Ôit leads to no harbor (but to a place of bewilderment, of nonsense)Õ (3). It is in the 




wider context of inner experience that Bataille proposes an internalisation of the experience of 
violence or the experience of the war, a dying without dying and of going as deep as possible 
into the darkest horrors yet returning intact. It is essential, therefore, to remember, that along 
with the experience of ecstasy, inner experience entails the experience of the horrible, of 
suffering and of anguish.
4
 
2. Life: an Open Wound: doleo ergo sum (I suffer therefore I am) 
Bataille begins Inner Experience, and with this his Summa Atheologica,
5
 by establishing 
manÕs Ôdesire to be everythingÕ (Bataille 1988b: xxxii), the desire to achieve human entirety, 
part of which implies a relation of knowledge between the knowing subject and the totality of 
everything which is to be known, only for this desire to be frustrated and registered as an 
impossibility due to the limits human beings come with. In all three books of the Summa 
therefore, Bataille establishes the existence of a wound, which is primarily based on the lack 
of reconciliation between our incompleteness and the recognition of the impossibility of 
completeness, a painful gap which in the absence of God (Bataille 1988a: 14) is made deeper. 
In other words, he establishes for man an existential suffering, which in oneÕs effort to ignore 
or avoid, the alternative is Ôinner hypocrisyÕ (Bataille 1988b: xxxii). In the same way, Guilty 
and On Nietzsche set out with this suffering being taken for granted, and develop as 
manifestations of the authorÕs relating to this suffering, as a proof of living to the height of it:  
If my suffering were eliminated [...] human life would peter out. And as life vanished, so too 
would our far-off, inevitable truth, the truth that incompleteness, death, and the unquenchable 
desire are, in a sense, beingÕs never-to-be-healed wound, without which inertia (while death 
absorbs us into itself and thereÕs no more change) would imprison us. (Bataille 1988b: 24) 
This wound which is crucial in BatailleÕs thought is never to be healed because Ôwithout your 
pain, youÕre nothing!Õ (Bataille 1988a: 69). An open wound becomes therefore the condition 
of a human and sovereign
6
 life and the experience of pain is by no means a symptom of 
weakness. Those in pain should not feel pity for themselves, for what they should seek is 
strength: ÔI donÕt avoid either pain or wounds. Wounded in my eyes or gut? What I want all 
                                                
4
  One may already perceive the Heideggerian reverberations in the concept of anguish (Angst), as well as in 
the concept of project and the idea of death being relevant to the way we live rather than the way we die (being-
toward-death), which appear later in this paper. However, such a comparative reading merits a much more 
extensive analysis and will not be attempted here.  
5
  Summa Atheologica (La Somme athologique) is a trilogy consisting of Inner Experience (1943), Guilty 
(1944) and On Nietzche (1945). The title of the trilogy is a meaningful distortion of Thomas AquinasÕ 13th 
century unfinished theological treatise Summa Theologica.  
6
  ÔSovereignty can only exist on the condition that it should never assume power, which is action, the primacy 
of the future over the present momentÕ (Bataille 1973: 134). 




the same is strength, not sicknessÑunwavering strength. [É] Strength comes from knowing 
the secret, and the secretÕs revealed in anguishÕ (57). 
I claim that an understanding of BatailleÕs Ôethics of violenceÕ, implies an understanding 
of the concept of anguish, which is both the generator and the result of the suffering. Anguish 
does not have an end and does not lead anywhere other than anguish: If the will to anguish 
can only ask questions, the answer, if it comes, wills that anguish be maintained. The answer 
is, anguish is your fateÕ (75). It is pain that maintains the wound open and, quite predictably, 
experiences of shock and suffering are of particular interest for Bataille.  
3. Violent Stimuli 
It was at around the age of twenty, that Bataille started to become aware of the emergence of a 
deep fascination with violence. It can be thought that this fascination, which was both of an 
emotional and intellectual nature, had been triggered by a number of incidents Bataille 
experienced at that time as well as by other peopleÕs ideas with which he had become 
familiar.  
The first one, chronologically, is the tragic death of the Spanish matador Manolo 
Granero, in Madrid in 1922. Despite the fact that he was not close enough to the ring to see 
the actual accident, in which GraneroÕs head was pierced through the right eye, this death, 
horrified and fascinated Bataille. This is critical to our understanding of BatailleÕs later 
perception of violence and horror; after describing how Ôtheatrical entranceÕ of GraneroÕs 
death at the festivalÕs height had an Ôevident, expected and intolerable qualityÔ, he continues: 
ÔFrom that day on I never went to a bullfight without a sense of anguish straining my nerves 
intensely. This anguish not in the least diminished my desire to go to the bullringÕ. The crucial 
point is his next observation: ÔOn the contrary, it exacerbated it, taking shape with a feverish 
impatience. I then began to understand that unease is often the secret of the greatest 
pleasuresÕ (Bataille in Surya 2002: 43Ð44; emphasis in the original). The emphasis by Bataille 
in this last sentence is important in showing how his fascination with as well as horror of 
extreme violence is of both an affective and an intellectual nature, and how, eventually, 
Bataille would become attracted by experiences which could grant this kind of unease, 
connecting one back to the existential wound. In other words, Bataille focuses on the product 
of the experience of violence and not on the violent act per se, which for Bataille has to be 
stripped of any moral judgments. 




This experience was followed by BatailleÕs introduction to photographs of the Ling Chi 
Chinese torture.
7
 These showed several stages of an act of torture which entailed cutting one 
hundred pieces from the victimÕs body.
8
 Besides the obvious horror that these photos aroused, 
Bataille was especially intrigued by the quasi-ecstatic expression on the victimÕs face. The 
unique quality that Bataille finds in this specific example of torture, which is not found in 
other, religiously justified torture for example, depends on the fact that in the Chinese torture 
there is no meaning, no redemption and no salvation implied. It is a simple squandering of 
life. Then and only then, does horror acquire its sacred quality, when torture and horror are 
experienced meaninglessly and purposelessly; when, in other words, pain is wasted. Bataille 
writes: ÔThis photograph had a decisive role in my life. I have never stopped being obsessed 
by this image of pain, at once ecstatic (?) and intolerableÕ (Bataille 1989: 206; question mark 
in the original).  
Moreover, BatailleÕs fascination with death and violence was enhanced by his research on 
the human sacrifices practiced by the Aztec, a lifestyle disturbed by violence, horror and 
death that was to become for Bataille the model of a healthy and sovereign society. Related to 
the idea of sacrifice is BatailleÕs concept of Ôgeneral economyÕ which is based on the notion 
of ÔexpenditureÕ, which implies BatailleÕs convictions that Ôa society always produces more 
than is necessary for its survival; it has a surplus at its disposalÕ (Bataille 1988c: 106) and that 
people should also indulge in expenditure, squandering and prodigality with the same passion 
with which they work, produce and accumulate. This is an idea that Bataille extends from 
Marcel MaussÕ research and analysis of the Native American tribesÕ customs of gift giving 
and of ÔpotlatchÕ, the tribal chiefsÕ competing in the destruction of considerable amounts of 
wealth. Suspicious of Western values and trust in moderation, hard work and measures to 
secure the future, Bataille, therefore, dismisses work as Ôthe foundation for knowledge and 
reason, [...] which humanized the animal we once wereÕ (Bataille 1989: 41). Bataille draws 
from MaussÕ discoveries but extends the notion of expenditure from its economic and 
material context to the more general framework of his philosophy so that it encompass 
activities such as oneÕs own putting into risk, maintaining oneÕs wound open and exposing 
oneself to shocks, depression, crises, wars and horrors. At the same time, Bataille is aware of 
the fact that expenditure, of any type, is met with great resistance, and claims that Ôbetween 
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  Transliteration of the Chinese name of the torture, which can be translated as slow slicing, slow process, 
lingering death or death by a thousand cuts. It literally means cutting into pieces. 
8
  These photographs were taken by Georges Dumas in 1905 and seen by Bataille via Adrien Borel, his analyst, 
in 1925. 




the horrors of war and the renunciation of one of the activities by which a society believes it 
must assure its future, society chooses warÕ (Bataille in Surya 2002: 385), a cursed choice, 
humanityÕs Ôaccursed shareÕ. 
4. War: From an Amoral Perspective 
Predictably enough, Bataille embraces unreservedly what can provide the individual with 
anguish, suffering and pain: ÔChange and disturbance help give thought the ability to wound, 
while peaceful times hardly do this. To conquer truthÕs equivocations, you have to have times 
that turn people and things upside down, instead of letting them stagnateÕ (Bataille 1988a: 
59). Bataille acknowledges that manÕs tendency, and sign of weakness, is to remain in a state 
of stagnation rather than accepting the violent play of change. This weakness is due to the fact 
that man is unavoidably plunged in time, history and the realm of project. For Bataille it is 
imperative that man take a distance, an amoral distance, from the realm of project which will 
enable him to see things in their necessary, ahistoric and amoral universality. Distancing 
himself from the realm of project and history implies that man realises that death Ôis the only 
serious denial of illusion, for if I die, the world is in no longer reducible to my spirit which 
reflects it. [É] For I count for nothing; it is the world only which mattersÕ (Bataille 1986b: 
65Ð66). 
Bataille does take this distant view; as Surya observes: Ô[He] abstained from pronouncing 
himself morally on any particular fact (the events of 1934, the rise of fascism, for example), 
from judging as a moralist; which is to say judging [É] from the perspective of what had to 
be and what must beÕ (Surya 2002: 428). Such a distance and abstention of course can be 
challenged for their ethical implications. How can one experience war ahistorically while war 
is taking place? How legitimate is it for Bataille, who otherwise says that he would indeed be 
willing to fight if the conditions demanded or permitted it,
9
 to read Hervie and Proust while a 
battle is unfolding (Bataille 1992: 162) or to write at the bar and drink during an air raid 
(124)? Yet Bataille writes in the opening pages of Guilty that Ôno one relates to the war 
madness, IÕm the only one who can do thisÕ (Bataille 1988a: 12). And if it is neither the 
combat aspect of war he finds fascinating,
10
 nor the political aspect of it,
11
 then what is it? 
What kind of relation with the war does Bataille claim to have?  
                                                
9
  ÔIÕm not unaffected by the war. IÕd be glad to give my blood, weariness, and whatÕs more, the brutal 
moments undergone at deathÕs approachÕ (Bataille 1988a: 12). 
10
  ÔI despise the boorishness of people drawn to the combat aspect of warÕ (Ibid: 56). 
11
  Ô[T]he political is what justifies war, its results are political ... But not war itselfÕ (Surya 2002: 285; ellipsis 
and emphasis in the original). 




From September to June, to the extent that war was going on, my awareness of it consisted of 
anguish. I saw in the war something ordinary life lacked Ð something that caused fear and 
prompts horror and anguish. I turned to it to lose my thinking in horror Ð for me, war was 
torment, falling off a rooftop, a volcano erupting. [É] it attracted me by provoking anguish. 
(Bataille 1988a: 56) 
By Ôwar madnessÕ then, Bataille does not mean the practicalities of war. Rather, he implies an 
internalisation of the war experience: ÔSitting on the edge of the bed, facing a window and the 
night, I practiced, determined to become a war zone myselfÕ (15). Internalised thus, the war 
experience has nothing to do with the actual killing out there and becomes useful for inner 
experience. Bataille says so explicitly: ÔI wonÕt speak of war, but of mystical experience. [...] 
[H]ow even for a moment can I dismiss this non-knowledge, a feeling of having lost my way 
in some underground tunnel?Õ (12)  
It is important to clarify that even if Bataille is fascinated by war, he nevertheless does 
not call for a revolution of absolute violence. He does not suggest that everybody be killed 
and annihilated, or that a constant state of massacre be established. ÔIt is not that evil would be 
the contrary of justiceÕ (Bataille in Surya 2002: 430). This would imply the dissolution of 
limits, and transgression. an important concept for Bataille, would no longer be possible. Let 
us remember that Bataille does not call for an eradication of morality but for its transgression. 
However, even if it is only the acknowledgement of death to which Bataille wants people to 
commit through violence, horror or the death of the other, he does not exclude real death from 
being there, available always as a possibility, as a threat, keeping the wound of anguish open. 
ÔFor the individual, partial loss is a means of dying while surviving. ItÕs foolish to try to avoid 
the horror of loss. [...] You have to come as close as possible to death. Without flinching. And 
even, if necessary, flinching. ...and even, if necessary, dyingÕ (Bataille 1988a: 93; ellipsis and 
emphasis in the original). 
What grants the individual the experience of anguish is the acknowledgement that real 
death always exists as a possibility, a possibility that in the Batallean system is revalued and 
repositioned as a process within life and not simply as the end of life: ÔBut I like death: the 
idea of death, which I donÕt see as a failureÕ (Bataille in Surya 2002: 492). Death is not a 
passage from life to something other but that human possibility which alone defines what the 
human is. Death should become part of life, not as something castrated, familiar and 
predictable (like it is in the concentration camps or in the case of suicide), but as the tragic 
and horrible instant that it is. But the real event of death is apparently the only thing that can 
alleviate suffering and heal the wound: ÔSomeday my tragedy will know completion and IÕll 
die. Only that day, because IÕve anticipated it and put myself in its light, gives meaning to 




what I am. I havenÕt any other hopeÕ (Bataille 1988a: 15). At the moment of death, existence 
is justified and the wound is healed. 
5. Bataille and Fascism  
It may have already become apparent how BatailleÕs position with regard to violence, which 
is both overt and unskilfully self-defensive, and his fascination with war paved the way for a 
number of accusations and reproaches concerning what has been considered an ambiguous 
stance in relation to fascism. Despite the likely validity of these reproaches and the 
seriousness of the historico-political context, my aim is to remain within BatailleÕs 
perspective and look at how he responded to these reproaches rather than providing an 
accurate account of them.
12
  
In pre-war France, when popular opinion was placing its hopes on communism and was 
investing in the possibility of left-inspired revolution, Bataille was among the very few who 
were extremely critical of communism, and fascism could have been interpreted favourably 
for the promise it was coming with for a complete Aufklrung (enlightenment, be this social, 
economic or political). Surya observes that: 
Bataille was not a man of the left, [...]: he had hardly any belief Ð if at all Ð in mankind. He did 
not believe in progress [...]: he therefore did not believe in historyÕ. Revolution for him Ôwould 
resemble a catastrophe more than a peace, an irrationality rather than a rationality, a liberation 
of the instincts than their equitable ordering. (2002: 225) 
Not at all unintentionally, Bataille had his name associated with acts and statements such as 
the one which appears in one of the last pamphlets of Contre-Attaque in March 1936.
13
 The 
specific pamphlet was titled Sous le feu des canons franaise ... et allis (Under fire from the 
French ... and alliesÕ canons), written by Jean Dautry and signed by Bataille among others. 
The pamphlet read: ÔWe are against the scraps of paper and the slave prose of chancellorsÕ 
offices É To them we prefer in every case and without being duped the antidiplomatic 
brutality of Hitler, less surely mortal for peace than the dribbling provocation of diplomats 
and politicians (in Surya 2002: 225; ellipsis in the original). In a defensive attitude towards 
Dautry, drawing from his active participation in left and communist movements, Surya 
minimises the politically frightening implications of this tract but cannot hide his 
disappointment with this fact which he describes ÔimprudentÕ, and implies that Bataille should 
know better when it comes to the not always clear relationship between ideas, words and 
actions:  
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  For an account of BatailleÕs place in fascist politics see Richard WolinÕs ÔLeft Fascism: Georges Bataille and 
the German IdeologyÕ, Constellations, Vol.2, Issue 3, pp. 397Ð428, 26 Oct 2006.  
13
  Contre-Attaque was a politically inspired movement Bataille co-founded with Andr Breton in 1935. 




This is extraordinary, for Bataille was a long way from being able to subscribe to such a 
declaration himself. He wrote nothing which authorises us to suspect or allows us to think that 
his hatred of clerical bourgeois parliamentarianism was such that he preferred the unbridled 
brutality of National Socialism. Nothing at all, and yet ... (Surya 2002: 225; ellipsis in the 
original) 
And yet, Bataille refused to take seriously the implications of such actions.  
Because of these ÔsurfascistÕ tendencies, the group of Contre-Attaque soon called for its 
own dissolution, which Bataille recalls in his Autobiographical Note:  
Counterattack was dissolved at the end of the winter. (The supposed pro-fascist tendency on 
the part of certain of BatailleÕs friends, and, to a lesser degree, of Bataille himself. For an 
understanding of the element of truth in this paradoxical fascist tendency, despite its radically 
contrary intention, one should read Elio VittoriniÕs The Red Carnation, together with its 
strange postface. There is no doubt that the bourgeois world as it exists constitutes a 
provocation to violence and that, in that world, the exterior forms of violence hold a 
fascination. Be that as it may, Bataille considers, at least since Counterattack, that this 
fascination can lead to the worst.) (Bataille 1986a: 109)  
In this text, written circa 1958, Bataille repeatedly stresses the inaccuracy of such accusations 
but without justifying any further such a protest. This is seen particularly in the phrases: 
Ôsupposed pro-fascist tendencyÕ, Ôparadoxical fascist tendencyÕ, Ôradically contrary intentionÕ, 
as well as in the reference to VittoriniÕs work; The Red Carnation was written in 1933-35, 
published in 1948, and is known for its anti-fascist affiliations. Despite this protest, Bataille 
retains his polemical attitude towards the bourgeois hypocrisy of complete denial of violence. 
However, he has spoken of Auschwitz as Ôthe decisive, undisputed and irreducible sign of 
evilÕ (Bataille in Surya 2002: 429), and 1958 was most probably the first time that he admitted 
that fascination with violence Ôcan lead to the worstÕ. Yet, even if for Bataille the specific war 
Ôhad not had the effect he hoped: one of clarificationÕ
14
 (Surya 2002: 364), his fascination 
with war did not fade away.  
In an attempt to defend Bataille, Michel Surya and Dennis Hollier, among others, try to 
provide clues for a distinction between BatailleÕs project and Nazi ideology, especially when 
it comes to their approach to violence and death. Bataille treated death as the meaningless and 
purposeless event of annihilation that it is, while fascism glorified death, bestowing on it 
power and immunity. Moreover, violence for Bataille was sovereign and emancipating, in the 
sense that it was transgressing taboos, while fascist violence was legalised by becoming 
utilitarian and nationally useful. The motivations therefore behind the Nazi violence were 
accumulation of power and extermination of the heterogeneous other, which were completely 
incompatible with the Bataillean principles. Fascism could not include in its project of 
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  By ÔclarificationÕ, Surya here means Aufklrung (enlightenment). 




cleansing and purity the ignoble and the filthy and the excluded that Bataille defended and 
considered as elements and manifestations of the heterogeneous.  
Despite or rather because of the monstrosities of Nazism which Bataille had 
acknowledged,
15
 he had not been willing to dismiss Nazi violence as humanly impossible. 
Bataille was provokingly stressing, as amorally as possible, that Auschwitz was absolutely 
humanly possible. Auschwitz therefore became a manifestation of humanity not in its 
specificity but in its universality: ÔLike you and I, those responsible for Auschwitz had a 
human nose, mouth, voice and reason, they were able to make love, have children; like the 
pyramids or the Acropolis, Auschwitz is a fact and sign of mankind. ManÕs image is 
henceforth inseparable from a gas chamberÕ (Bataille in Surya 2002: 359). Bataille does not 
separate people between the executed and the executioners but, rather, tries to locate what in 
their being makes the execution possible, something that is a characteristic of not only the 
executioners but the victims as well. Such an acknowledgement may not take anything away 
from its horror but is essential for saving humanity from repeating the same catastrophes, 
precisely because by being aware of such a possibility, humanity will be able to anticipate and 
prevent it from happening. This is what Richardson and Surya seem to imply when they say 
respectively: ÔBatailleÕs whole thinking assumes that the enormity of what happened in the 
concentration camps was not an aberration of mankind, rather it showed the danger we run if 
we engage in a collective repression of our fundamental inner violenceÕ (Richardson 1994: 
132) and Ôto wish to ignore [the possibility of violence] would be to expose oneself to [its] 
sudden re-emergence in one form or anotherÕ (Surya 2002: 360). 
The distinction that needs to be made here, therefore, is between justification and 
explanation. Bataille does not justify the Nazi monstrosities but he dares to explain them, and 
this, for him, should be enough for there to be no misunderstandings as to his position vis  
vis them. We, however, may still find this explanation disturbing and be unwilling to go along 
and say with him, as he does when defending Nietzsche, that ÔitÕs frightening to see thought 
reduced to the propaganda levelÕ (Bataille 1992: xxii). Surya accurately suggests that Bataille 
should have been more careful with the implications and responsibility of theory in a reality 
which is in a state of socio-political vulnerability, confusion and turmoil. But do we not 
misread Bataille if we read as evil these states which have to be avoided at all costs? Is this 
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  ÔThere is generally an oppressive and sickening element in the fact of being a man which it is necessary to 
overcome. But this weight and this repugnance have never been so oppressive as after AuschwitzÕ (Bataille in 
Surya 2002: 359). 




not the very same thought he wants us to escape from in order to be able to redefine ourselves 
in relation to the heterogeneous?  
Conclusion  
I have so far analysed violence as one manifestation or expression of the heterogeneous. 
However, at this stage, I would like to argue that violence is not only one of the 
manifestations of the heterogeneous but that it lends itself to the heterogeneous completely. 
The heterogeneous is imbued in violence; it is violent. In ÔThe Psychological Structure of 
FascismÕ Bataille writes that Ô[h]eterogeneous reality is that of a force or shockÕ (Bataille 
1979: 70). The expression of the heterogeneous always hides in it an attack, especially in the 
forceful and violent way it confronts the homogeneous, servile, assimilative and 
commensurable reality. But most importantly, the heterogeneous is violent for what it is and 
what it is carries within it evil. Despite the fact that violence and evil are two different 
concepts, they are in this context related in the sense that violence is presented as an 
expression of evil: Ô[T]he summit isnÕt a submission to but a willing of evil. It is a voluntary 
pact with sin, crime, and evil. A pact made with a relentless fate that requires that while some 
live, others dieÕ (Bataille 1992: 26; emphasis in the original). 
What Bataille seems to be doing, therefore, is trying to provide an alternative evaluative 
judgement for evil, an alternative which claims not to be a judgement and which draws from 
BatailleÕs respect for the disturbing work of chance, which necessarily negates any possibility 
of a morally oriented judgement. Bataille clarifies that Ôevil is the opposite of a constraint that 
on principle is practiced with a view toward good. Of course evil isnÕt what a hypocritical 
series of misunderstandings makes it out to be: isnÕt it essentially a concrete freedom, the 
uneasy breaking of a tabooÕ (Bataille 1992: xxv)? And with this, he reminds us of his 
intention to distance himself and his project from morality as it is. Yet, he claims that the 
concept of evil does not exclude morality: on the contrary, it demands a ÔhypermoralityÕ 
(Bataille 1973: preface); it demands that morality be transgressed. Hypermorality, therefore, 
needs to be read in the light of Ôhold[ing] nothing backÕ and which favours Ôthe 
superabundance of forces, prodigality, ruin, luxury, perversity, sexual release, vice and crime, 
tearing apart and ecstasy, extreme anguish and deathÕ (Surya 2002: 425).  
The problem which arises, however, is that if we accept that the whole realm of 
heterogeneity is primarily violent, then by renouncing the component of violence for its 
potential ethical risks, the whole edifice of heterogeneity collapses too. Despite the 
frightening implications of hypermorality, such a renunciation for Bataille would not be 




legitimate. In my opinion, the ethical and political ambiguity to which BatailleÕs thought may 
give rise is consciously left unresolved by Bataille, who never felt the need to provide any 
serious response to politically oriented accusations. For this reason there has never been any 
clearly articulated self-defence, unlike the monumental defence he made on behalf of 
Nietzsche.  
Any effort to understand BatailleÕs Ôethics of violenceÕ, I claim, is bound to end in 
frustration, for doing so implies breathing the Ôirrespirable airÕ of BatailleÕs summit where 
evil (being open to the amoral working of chance) is good and good (a hypocritical repression 
and rejection of the heterogeneous) is evil, in other words, where morality gives way to 
hypermorality. For Bataille it was obvious, and it should be obvious to all, that his project, 
even if scary, was not legitimating or endorsing the Nazi brutalities: Ôno one, of course, is 
going to claim that I wish to start new cycles of holocaustÕ (Bataille 1986b: 61). Because of 
the lack of a loud and clearly articulated protest against the Nazi brutalities however, 
BatailleÕs political or ethical stance was not at all obvious. It remains, lastly, to consider how 
pharmaceutical BatailleÕs Ôethics of violenceÕ is and to decide whether the therapeutic and 
poisonous dosages are correct.  
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